SMEs access to formal finance in post-communist economies:Do institutional structure and political connectedness matter? by Ruziev, Kobil & Webber, Don
 1 
 
 
 
Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 
 
 
             
SMEs access to formal finance in post-communist economies: 
 
Do institutional structure and political connectedness matter? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kobil Ruziev and Don J Webber 
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Working Paper Series 
1701 
  
 2 
 
SMEs access to formal finance in post-communist economies: 
Do institutional structure and political connectedness matter? 
 
 
Kobil Ruziev and Don J Webber
* 
 
 
In post-communist economies, a disproportionately greater share of formal 
finance is channelled to larger enterprises and SMEs lack appropriately-priced 
formal finance. This article examines whether institutional structure and 
interpersonal connectedness with bureaucrats exacerbate this formal finance 
misallocation. We show that access to and use of interpersonal bureaucratic 
networks improve chances of receiving formal bank credit by between 4–10%. 
The benefits of interpersonal links are stronger for larger SMEs, and being 
connected to bureaucratic networks is not associated with enterprise growth. 
These findings imply that traditional policies that increase bank finance to SMEs 
should also aim to improve impartiality of bureaucratic institutions and 
enforceability of private contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) heralded a transition of the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern European (EE) countries from a centrally planned to 
a market-based system. The ideological belief that a centrally planned system is concomitant 
with wastefulness while a market-based system yields an efficient allocation of resources 
(Kornai, 1982) was central to this extraordinary shift.   
 Although this belief might be true in principle, in reality various forms of 
inefficiencies occur in market-based systems and especially in the provision of financial 
services to enterprises.  A rich body of empirical studies now emphasises that the distribution 
of formal finance is skewed towards larger enterprises and against small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) who subsequently pay higher interest rates despite having higher capital 
productivity (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Claessens and Perotti, 2007).   
Conventional explanations of this apparent inefficiency emphasise market and 
information imperfections as major causes of misallocation (Mina et al., 2013). More recent 
analyses highlight the role of institutional and political factors; for instance, Dasgupta (2005) 
and Rose (2001) argue that when anonymous market relations are imperfect and bureaucratic 
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institutions lack credibility then rent-seeking behaviours become prevalent and extend well 
beyond the level of the political elite with ordinary agents trying to profit from a web of 
interpersonal relations. In less than efficient market conditions, a thick network of exclusive 
interpersonal relations can emerge to resolve allocative and redistributive issues, including 
access to formal finance (Fedderke et al., 1999). The importance of political connections for 
gaining access to formal finance is well known for large enterprises (Faccio, 2006; Faccio et 
al., 2006; Shurchkov, 2012, Boubakri et al., 2012, 2013; Cull et al., 2015) but there is only 
limited evidence for SMEs (Ruziev and Midmore, 2015). 
Our rationale for focusing on SMEs and their access to formal finance is 
multidimensional. First, SMEs play an especially important role in emerging economies. 
They account for more than 90 percent of all enterprises and are more labour intensive, and 
hence contribute strongly to employment growth and facilitate poverty reduction.  Second, to 
our knowledge, this is the first study that specifically assesses the impact of SMEs’ 
interpersonal connections with government officials on improving both their access to formal 
finance and their growth potential across post-communist economies (PCEs). Third, SMEs 
rely heavily on bank loans out of all the possible sources of external finance and, in our 
dataset, access to formal finance was chosen by SMEs as the second biggest obstacle (after 
the tax rate) in the business environment. More than 37 percent of SMEs also cited a lack of 
external finance as either the main or a severe obstacle to their operation and growth. Fourth, 
SMEs are not simply scaled down versions of large enterprises, which means they typically 
face qualitatively different obstacles for their operation and growth than larger enterprises. 
Fifth, unequal access to finance results in some SMEs operating at sub-optimal levels despite 
having high capital productivity.  Finally, given their long and time-consuming institution 
building experience towards a fully-fledged market economy, PCEs still provide an important 
case study example to investigate the impact of interpersonal relationships on gaining access 
to scarce and valuable resources including formal finance. 
We source data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) dataset supplied by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD, 2016). BEEPS includes information on over 14,000 SMEs across 28 PCEs from the 
FSU and EE, employs a standard questionnaire across all countries and includes a dedicated 
section focussing on business-government relations which allows for the construction of 
several proxy variables of interpersonal connectedness. Another advantage of the BEEPS 
dataset is that it allows us to estimate the impact of SMEs' interpersonal political 
connectedness on access to formal credit in three distinct ways, which, to our knowledge has 
not been done before. First, we estimate the impact of our target variables on improving 
SMEs’ access to bank credit. Second, conditional upon receiving a bank loan, we estimate the 
impact of our target variables on improving the stringency of collateral requirements. Third, 
we estimate the impact of interpersonal connectedness on reducing the cost of recent loans. 
Our findings indicate that institutional structure and political connectedness 
exacerbate the already skewed distribution of formal finance against SMEs in PCEs. In 
particular, well-connected SMEs are found to have greater access to bank credit despite 
having low productivity of capital which has implications for the allocation of such scarce 
resource as bank finance. One of the key implications of our findings is that, to be more 
effective, traditional policies on increasing bank finance to SMEs should also aim at 
improving impartiality of bureaucratic institutions and enforceability of private contracts. 
This study is organised as follows. The next section discusses relevant studies and 
exposes the gap in the literature. Section 3 provides contextual information about PCEs. 
Section 4 describes the data used in this study and presents stylised facts that emerge from an 
analysis of the raw data. Section 5 presents the estimation results and main findings. Section 
6 provides a discussion of the findings and concludes. 
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2. SMEs’ access to formal finance 
 
SMEs play an important role in market economies where they represent more than 95 percent 
of all enterprises (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009) and because SMEs tend to be more labour-
intensive compared with large enterprises, they also contribute more to employment growth 
and facilitate poverty reduction (Beck et al., 2005). Although the average size of SMEs varies 
with country-level per capita incomes, it has been estimated that SMEs in emerging 
economies with fewer than 100 workers employ more than half of the active labour force 
(Beck, 2013). SMEs are seen as an engine of growth and innovation with high-growth 
innovative enterprises being particularly important as they create most of the new jobs. For 
example, high-growth and innovative enterprises created more than half of all new jobs in the 
UK between 2003 and 2008 even though they accounted for only six percent of all 
enterprises (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2009). 
SMEs are usually set up either to pursue profitable market opportunities 
(transformational SMEs) or to avoid unemployment (subsistence SMEs) (Beck, 2013; 
Xheneti and Bartlett, 2012). Subsistence SMEs are almost exclusively micro-entrepreneurial 
and set up to generate subsistence income; their share of the SME population increases during 
economic downturns (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). Transformational SMEs can employ up 
to a couple of hundred people but only a small proportion of them ever succeed in becoming 
large enterprises. Most transformational SMEs never grow beyond a minimum efficiency 
scale due to, for example, owners’ lifestyle orientation, market failures, policy and 
institutional constraints and/or a lack of access to adequately priced external finance 
(Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). 
Access to formal finance is generally lower in emerging economies. Almost one-third 
of enterprises in emerging economies cite a lack of external finance as either the main or a 
severe obstacle to their operation and growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). Poor access 
to financial services in developing countries may be due to high fixed costs associated with 
the provision of financial services and tight entry regulations (Claessens and Perotti, 2007) 
but low income countries typically lack a sufficiently large pool of domestic savings that can 
be efficiently mobilised to meet the demands for external finance. The existence of this 
external finance problem over a longer run can be explained by political factors; for instance, 
reforms that might challenge the status quo and affect the ability of the incumbent elite to 
extract rents would be resisted by that incumbent elite (Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
In principle, under perfectly functioning market conditions, enterprises should be 
indifferent between alternative sources of external finance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and 
all projects with positive net present values should be financed regardless of enterprise size. 
However, in practice, SMEs often rely on bank loans out of all the possible sources of 
external finance (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997) and the distribution of 
limited formal finance is skewed against SMEs who subsequently pay higher interest rates 
than their larger counterparts (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Unequal access to finance 
affects investment and hence growth because some profitable entrepreneurial initiatives may 
never receive external finance and will operate at sub-optimal levels despite having high 
capital productivity (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). 
Conventional explanations of the unequal distribution of finance emphasise market 
and information imperfections as the main underlying causes of misallocation away from 
SMEs (Mina et al., 2013). These imperfections originate from a variety of areas. For instance, 
SMEs should not be regarded as simply scaled down versions of large enterprises (Beck, 
2013) as they are usually younger, less likely to possess acceptable collateral, informationally 
more opaque and face stiffer competition in product markets, which then affect cash flow 
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forecasting (Ruziev and Midmore, 2015). Despite SMEs accounting for a large share of 
enterprises, banks cannot fully utilise the law of large numbers to exploit economies of scale 
and enjoy the associated diversification benefits when lending to SMEs (Beck, 2013) and 
hence lending to SMEs is seen as higher risk, which leads to lower supply and higher costs of 
bank loans to SMEs (Berger et al., 2001). 
An alternative explanation of the asymmetric availability of formal finance has been 
put forward by institutional economists and emphasises the role of institutional and political 
factors. Modern market-based economies are composed of anonymous markets, impersonal 
bureaucratic organisations and communitarian institutions that depend upon interpersonal 
networks (Dasgupta, 2005, Bauernschuster et al. 2010). Under such circumstances, 
entrepreneurial decisions will respond not only to market prices but also to rules and 
regulations that can jointly shape and manipulate incentivising and hindering mechanisms. 
Impersonal public and private bureaucratic organisations, which operate under the rule of 
law, facilitate the process of exchange, production and investment by enforcing rules, 
regulations and contracts (North, 1990; Weber, 1968).  The interrelationships between these 
three layers of the economic structure are dynamic and change with the level of economic 
development (Stiglitz, 2001). Meanwhile, bureaucratic institutions in thin and 
underdeveloped markets usually lack credibility, cause inefficiencies and weaken market-
based incentivising and constraining mechanisms. As a result, the role of bureaucratic 
institutions can be partly replaced by community-ruled horizontal webs of interpersonal 
networks that can grow in importance in production and exchange relations (Stiglitz, 2001). 
As a consequence, a network of exclusive interpersonal and reputation-based relations will 
emerge to resolve allocative and redistributive questions, including access to formal finance. 
Fighting against this can be the expansion of the market-based exchange system, which can 
develop, deepen and eventually reduce the importance of communitarian institutions, only to 
be replaced by formal contracts embedded in impersonal legal systems (Stiglitz, 2001). 
A further explanation of the asymmetric availability of formal finance is that the less 
than impartial political elite affect economic outcomes formally through red tape and 
informally through individual connections and interpersonal relations. There is growing 
evidence which suggests that political connections play an important role in gaining access to 
formal finance and that larger enterprises gain more benefit from such connections (La Porta 
et al., 2002; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012; 2013; 
Cull et al., 2015). Entrenched elites may influence business environments by adopting formal 
rules and regulations to protect their rent-seeking interests and create unfavourable 
operational constraints and obstacles for enterprises. This can result in a culture of 
favouritism and bribery which further suppresses market-based impersonal exchange and 
resource allocation (Fedderke et al., 1999; Dort et al., 2014) and international evidence shows 
that smaller firms suffer more from these constraints (Schiffer and Weder, 2003). 
Competing views exist on the influence and ultimate impact of corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour on allocative efficiency and social welfare (Aidt et al., 2008; Green, 2011; 
Aligica and Tarko, 2014). Successful firms that generate more surplus can better afford to 
offer bribes and kickbacks and gain advantageous access to scarce resources, which can result 
in socially beneficial outcomes (Duvanova, 2014; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; 
Manion, 1996; Li, 1998; Du and Girma, 2010). This view, however, ignores the interpersonal 
nature of relations between public officials and entrepreneurs when supposedly ‘impersonal’ 
bureaucratic organisations do not enjoy full credibility. 
Interpersonal networks are used more often when anonymous markets are suppressed, 
rent seeking behaviour is prevalent and rules and laws are dysfunctional (Dasgupta, 2005). 
Although interpersonal links may require some form of eventual pecuniary reward in 
exchange for favours, non-pecuniary obligations may dominate as these can be recurrent and 
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produce continuous benefits to both parties. Furthermore, soliciting bribes is not costless for 
corrupt bureaucrats even under these circumstances, as there is always a danger that they may 
be caught in the process and thus bureaucrats are more likely to cooperate with people who 
they know and trust to minimise the risk of being caught (Becker, 1968; Ryvkin and Serra, 
2012). Hence, having the right interpersonal connections becomes more valuable than simply 
affording explicit monetary payments as bribes.  
Not all entrepreneurs are fortunate enough to have economically beneficial 
interpersonal networks and the most valuable networks can be the most exclusive. Belonging 
to a single network may open access to other networks as some entrepreneurs will be 
members of multiple networks. For example, entrepreneurs may gain indirect access to 
formal finance through their connections with government officials. The interpersonal and 
exclusive natures of such networks vindicate that a small number of strategically well-
connected entrepreneurs will be able to seize a disproportionately large share of common 
resources and opportunities, which can result in further allocative inefficiencies (McKean, 
1992). This compares to anonymous market-based exchange systems which can be thought to 
be more efficient because ‘the best’ buyer or seller may not be a part of exclusive networks 
(Serageldin and Grootaert, 2001). 
 
3. Post-communist economies: a brief background 
 
PCEs had relatively similar economic conditions when they started their transformations 
towards market-based systems in the late 1980s, especially in relation to the banking structure 
and enterprise finances (Dow et al., 2008). However, unlike other emerging economies where 
firms’ access to formal finance had historically been poor, PCEs had to deal with an over-
dependence of enterprises on bank finance at the start of transition; table 1 shows that often 
half of enterprises’ working capital was financed by bank credit. Kornai (1982) calls this 
phenomenon ‘soft budget constraints’ and argues that it was one of the main causes of 
resource misallocation under central planning, as it allowed loss-making enterprises to stay 
afloat. As for fixed capital financing, enterprise start up capitals and investment expansions 
were financed from state budgets as non-repayable grants and subsidies (Ruziev and Dow, 
2014).  
 
Table 1: Sources of enterprise working capital financing in the FSU in 1980 
 National Economy Industry Agriculture Trade 
Own resources  24.0 33.0 22.8 28.0 
Bank credits  46.3 50.2 55.7 56.6 
Other  29.7 16.8 21.5 15.4 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Geraschenko and Lavrushin (1982) 
 
 
 In the early years of transition, policymakers prioritised macroeconomic reforms 
(such as privatization, price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilisation) and a hardening 
of ‘soft budget constraints’ (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). Liberalisation policies were fast and 
perceived to be successful in small-scale enterprise and retail sectors in all transition 
economies. Opportunities emerged for private entrepreneurial activities that resulted in higher 
demand for financial services. However, rhetoric concerning increasing productive capacities 
of SMEs and improving their access to financial services was not matched by policy. In 
particular, hardening of the soft budget constraints was a painful experience and involved a 
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complete restructuring of the banking sector. The sudden and sharp reduction in bank credit 
resulted in enterprises resorting to alternative ways of financing working capital; bartering, 
transactions in promissory notes, inter-enterprise arrears and mutual debt write-offs were 
observed in almost all PCEs in the late 1990s (Carlin et al., 2000) but were most severe in 
Russia and Ukraine where, at its peak in 1998, barter accounted for more than 50 percent of 
all industrial transactions (Ivanenko and Mikheyev, 2002). 
 Table 2 presents financing sources of SMEs’ working and fixed capital in 2012-14 
and illustrates that formal finance by banks to enterprises remained considerably lower than 
in the pre-transition period but continued to be the most important source of external finance 
for SMEs. In particular, bank financing of SME activities was lower on average in Georgia 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) compared to that in the EE region, with 
this difference being more pronounced for fixed capital financing. Part of this difference may 
be explained by macroeconomic conditions (e.g. depth of financial sector development, 
progress made in banking and enterprise reforms, per capita income levels) and figure 1 
highlights that most CIS countries are less developed financially and have lower per capita 
income levels compared to their EE counterparts. 
 
 
Table 2: SME financing sources according to BEEPS survey data 
(As a percentage of total financing) 
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Figure 1. Measures of Financial Depth and Per Capita Income in 2013.  
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 An important caveat, however, is that these aggregate indicators are broad and do not 
fully reflect the variation in institutional and financial constraints faced by SMEs. For 
example, while more developed financial systems generally offer better access to financial 
services, aggregate measures of financial development (e.g. private sector credits, broad 
money, banking sector assets, etc.) do not provide enough information about the breadth and 
quality of financial depth and neglect other issues, such as the proportion of economically 
active entities responsible for the utilisation of available formal finance (Claessens and 
Perotti, 2007). Despite the intensification of market-based exchanges and improving 
credibility of formal bureaucratic organisations in most PCEs, evidence suggests that public 
officials and civil servants in otherwise impersonal bureaucratic organisations still 
personalise their positions by using the rigidity of rules and regulations as an excuse for rent-
seeking (Duvanova, 2014), which Rose (2001) describes as an organisational failure and with 
smaller enterprises affected disproportionately more by these institutional constraints 
(Schiffer and Weder, 2003; Ruziev and Midmore, 2015). 
Given the underlying literature and the PCE context, we sought to identify answers to 
the following strategically important questions:  
 
1. Does access to and use of interpersonal bureaucratic networks improve the chance of 
SMEs receiving formal credit? 
2. Are benefits to interpersonal bureaucratic networks more important for smaller or 
larger SMEs? 
3. Is enterprise growth associated with bureaucratic networks? 
 
We proceed to empirically examine whether being connected to an exclusive network 
is important in enabling SMEs to gain access to valuable resources in economies where 
bureaucratic institutions lack credibility and efficiency, which breeds a culture of favouritism, 
corruption and bribery. Since belonging to a network may also open access to other networks, 
it is possible to gain indirect access to formal finance when one has personal connections 
with government officials.  
 
4.  Data 
 
We sourced data from the 2012-2014 sweep of the BEEPS dataset (EBRD, 2016), which 
provides information on more than 14,000 enterprises in 28 PCEs from the FSU and EE. The 
survey employs a stratified random sampling technique where the strata are based on firm 
size, economic sectors and geographic regions within each country. Around 360 enterprises 
were interviewed in most countries although a greater number were sampled in larger 
economies. Only formally registered enterprises with more than 5 employees were 
interviewed and enterprises with 5 to 19, 20 to 99 or 100 or more employees being defined as 
small, medium or large respectively. 
 Since SMEs are not simply scaled down versions of large enterprises (Beck, 2013) 
and typically do face qualitatively different obstacles for their operation and growth than 
larger enterprises, we extracted data from the BEEPS that corresponds only to SMEs. We 
removed unreliable and potentially implausible observations from the sample, which included 
enterprises who claimed to have bank credit but indicated no or limited (less than 200 local 
currency units) bank loans. We also dropped observations when interviewees admitted to 
reporting arbitrary and unreliable responses at the end of interviews. The total number of 
enterprise observations in our SME sample is 11,714. 
 The BEEPS dataset has several advantages. It uses a standard questionnaire across all 
countries and contains information on business environments, business-government relations 
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and enterprise characteristics, such as firm age, industry experience, annual sales and 
enterprise financing sources. The questionnaire also contains information on interpersonal 
connections. We draw on three binary variables: while securing government contracts 
(question j6a in the questionnaire) and subsidies (q.53) relate to the use of interpersonal 
networks, the frequency of payments of bribes and gifts (q.39) relates to the access to such 
networks. The question relating to access to interpersonal links asks SME managers about the 
behaviour of ‘typical firms.’ According to Dabla-Norris and Koeda (2008), enterprise 
managers base their responses on their own experiences when answering these types of 
questions. 
 Descriptions and summary statistics of the variables used are reported in table 3, 
which shows that the average age of SMEs in the sample is approximately 14 years with the 
standard deviation of 9 years, implying that more than two thirds of SMEs are at least 5 years 
old. The average SME has a relatively experienced manager (16 years). Almost one third of 
SMEs held bank loans for fixed and/or working capital needs, and banks required collateral 
for 81 percent of these loans. Thirty-one percent of enterprises claimed to have offered bribes 
and gifts to public officials at least sometimes and 20 percent held government contracts. Our 
sample is relatively evenly split between the services (53%) and manufacturing sectors. 
 Additional information about some of the variables is presented in tables 4-5. Table 4 
breaks down the data on bank loans, bribes and gifts, and government contracts across five 
geographic regions: 
o 11 EU member EE countries (EU-EE),1 
o 6 non-EU countries of EE (non-EU-EE),2 
o 3 countries of the Caucasus region,3 
o 4 countries from Central Asia4 and 
o 4 BRUM countries.5 
 
Enterprise access to bank loans varies across these regions: in general, SMEs have 
greater access to bank loans in the EE region which boasts more developed financial sectors 
and higher per capita income levels. Part of this can be explained by the strong presence of 
western banks in the EE region where the share of foreign-owned bank assets in total banking 
sector assets ranges from 60 to 90 percent across the region (Bonin et al., 2015). In contrast, 
foreign banks do not have significant presence in the CIS countries (Ruziev and Dow, 2014); 
for example, foreign banks in Russia accounted for less than 20 percent of banking sector 
assets in 2010 (IMF, 2011). A strong foreign bank presence can contribute to a deepening of 
the financial sector, and this explains the relatively high share of foreign-currency 
denominated loans in the EE region (>50%).  
 The practice of offering bribes and gifts seems to be more prevalent in the BRUM 
(around 40%) and Central Asia (33%) regions than in the non-EU-EE (28%), EU-EE (20%) 
and Caucasus (19%) regions. Government contracts also seem to be more prevalent in the 
BRUM and Central Asia regions (both 24%), followed by the EU-EE (19%), Caucasus (16%) 
and non-EU-EE (14%) regions. Although EU-EE countries are assigned higher scores in 
transition indicators of institutional and market reforms by international financial institutions 
(EBRD, 2011), around 20 percent of enterprises from this region reported offering bribes and 
                                                          
1
  Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia 
2
  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
3
  Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
4
  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
5
  Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova 
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gifts to government officials, which reflects the complex and time-consuming nature of 
building impersonal and market-facilitating bureaucratic organisations. 
 
Table 3: Description and summary statistics of main variables 
Variables Description μ σ N 
bank_loan 
=1 if in receipt of bank loan to finance working and/or fixed 
capital needs in the last fiscal year, =0 otherwise. 
0.28 0.45 11124 
collateral 
=1 if collateral was required for the most recent bank loan, 
=0 otherwise. 
0.81 0.39 3535 
loan_interest Annual interest charged on the most recent bank loan, %. 12.04 7.12 2799 
loan_fx 
=1 if the most recent loan is in foreign currency, =0 
otherwise. 
0.31 0.46 3606 
enterprise_age  Enterprise age in years. 13.63 9.39 11631 
enterprise_age2  enterprise_age squared divided by 100. 2.74 6.78 11631 
manager_experience  Top manager’s experience in the sector in years. 15.99 9.61 11425 
manager_experience2  manager_experience squared divided by 100. 3.48 4.16 11425 
trade_credit  Percentage of inputs purchased on credit. 37.88 37.09 10889 
leasing_fxassets  =1 if leasing fixed assets, =0 otherwise. 0.18 0.38 11645 
lnlabour  Natural log of full time employee numbers. 2.71 0.92 11714 
lnsales  Natural log of annual sales in the last fiscal year. 15.76 2.65 9317 
exp_sales  =1 if sales are expected to increase next year, =0 otherwise. 0.52 0.50 10600 
services  =1 if SME operates in the services sector, =0 otherwise. 0.53 0.50 11714 
exporter  =1 if SME directly or indirectly exports, =0 otherwise. 0.17 0.38 11714 
quality_cert  
=1 if SME hold internationally recognised quality certificate, 
=0 otherwise. 
0.18 0.39 11564 
accnts_audited 
=1 if most recent annual statement is certified by external 
auditors, =0 otherwise. 
0.27 0.44 11423 
product_concentr  Percentage of sales from main product/service 84.11 22.27 11352 
own_website  =1 if SME has its own website, =0 otherwise. 0.58 0.49 11680 
city 
=1 if main business city and/or population exceeds 1 million, 
=0 otherwise. 
0.29 0.45 11714 
Non_EU_EE 
=1 if non-EU member eastern European country, =0 
otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 11714 
caucasus  =1 if the Caucasus region, =0 otherwise. 0.11 0.31 11714 
BRUM  =1 if Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, =0 otherwise. 0.41 0.49 11714 
central_asia  =1 if the central Asia region, =0 otherwise. 0.09 0.28 11714 
bribes_n_gifts 
  
=1 if regularity of bribes and gifts was rated at least as 
"sometimes", =0 otherwise. 
0.31 0.46 10765 
gov_contract  =1 if government contract was obtained, =0 otherwise. 0.20 0.40 11565 
subsidies  =1 if subsidies received in the last three years, =0 otherwise. 0.07 0.26 11622 
dc Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP. 49.57 15.75 11714 
inflation  Annual CPI inflation, %. 4.34 3.57 11714 
tax_rate Corporate tax rate, %. 17.0 4.10 11714 
Note: μ refers to mean and σ to standard deviation; N is the number of observation  
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Table 4: Selection of sample variables across the regions 
 EU-EE Non-EU-EE  Caucasus BRUM CA 
SMEs with Bank Loans 35.5% 44.0% 30.3% 21.5% 17.3% 
FX Loans to Bank Loans  50.3% 54.6% 41.7% 6.5% 28.0% 
Bribes and Gifts 19.6% 27.5% 18.8% 40.10% 32.6% 
Government Contracts 19.4% 13.6% 15.5% 23.9% 23.7% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS 2012-2014 (EBRD, 2016) 
 
 
 Table 5 reveals the potential impact of interpersonal connections (as measured by 
bribes and gifts and government contracts) on access to bank loans across the five regions. 
Column A shows the proportion of SMEs with bank loans that reported offering bribes and 
gifts to public officials whereas column B shows the proportion of SMEs with bank loans that 
did not offer bribes and gifts; the difference between these two columns is presented in 
column C along with an indication of statistical significance using a t-test. Similar 
information for bank loans with and without government contracts is presented in column D-
F. As can be seen from column C, with the exception of the Central Asian region, a greater 
proportion of SMEs that bribed public officials obtained bank loans than SMEs that did not 
bribe and these differences are statistically significant.  In particular, the magnitudes of the 
differences between the two sub-sample averages reported in columns A and B were larger 
and their statistical significance levels stronger in the EE and Caucasus regions. Likewise, as 
can be seen from column F, a greater proportion of SMEs that held government contracts 
received bank loans compared to those that did not hold government contracts, and this time 
the results are statistically significant across all five regions.  
 
 
Table 5: SME use of bank loans under different sub-samples 
Regions 
Bank Loans Difference 
between 
(A) and 
(B) 
Bank Loans Difference 
between 
(D) and 
(E) 
Bribes and 
Gifts=Yes 
Bribes and 
Gifts=No 
Government 
contract=Yes 
Government 
contract=No 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
EU-EE 42.30% 34.20% 8.10%*** 43.00% 34.10% 8.90%*** 
Non-EU-EE 49.60% 41.90% 7.70%*** 57.10% 42.20% 14.90%*** 
Caucasus 38.40% 29.80% 8.60%*** 44.60% 28.40% 16.20%*** 
BRUM 23.20% 21.00% 2.20%** 25.80% 20.10% 5.70%*** 
CA 16.49% 17.01% -0.52% 21.40% 16.10% 5.30%** 
Note: * refers to 10%, ** to 5%, and *** 1% level of statistical significance respectively. Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on BEEPS 2012-2014 (EBRD, 2016) 
 
 
5. Bureaucratic connectedness and access to bank loans 
 
In our dataset more than 37 percent of SMEs reported that access to formal finance was a 
moderate to severe obstacle to their current operations and access to finance was chosen as 
the second biggest obstacle (after the tax rate) in the business environment. The raw data also 
indicates that SMEs with connectedness to bureaucrats seem to enjoy more privileged access 
to scarce resources. 
 We proceed to estimate econometric models to examine if SMEs with greater 
connectedness to bureaucrats have more privileged access to bank finance than those who do 
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not, and identify if such a relationship remains after controlling for a variety of firm- and 
country-specific characteristics. The equation to estimate is: 
 
Yi = α + Xiβ + Ziγ + εi           (1) 
 
where Y is a dependent variable that reflects the use of bank loans; X and Z are vectors of 
predictors that affect Y, where the former includes both continuous and categorical control 
variables reflecting firm-level characteristics and the latter includes variables representing 
interpersonal networks, namely bribes and gifts, government contracts and subsidies. 
Parameters α, β and γ are to be estimated and ε is the random error term. 
 The BEEPS dataset allows for the parameterisation of access to formal credit in three 
distinct ways. In model 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an SME held a bank 
credit for working and fixed capital purposes in the last fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Conditional upon receiving a bank loan, we parameterise the dependent variable in model 2 
by using data on whether collateral was requested for the most recent loan, with a variable 
equal to 1 if it was and equal to 0 otherwise. In model 3, the dependent variable measures the 
annual interest rate paid on the most recent loan.  The coefficient estimates in models 2 and 3 
are expected to have the opposite signs to those for model 1, as variables that relate to an 
improvement in access to bank loans (model 1) are also likely to reduce the relative 
stringency of collateral requirements (model 2) and lower the interest rate charges (model 3). 
We estimate models 1 and 2 using a probit maximum likelihood approach and model 3 using 
ordinary least squares. Marginal effect estimates at the mean after probit estimation for 
models 1 and 2 are provided along with OLS estimates for model 3. Asymptotic standard 
errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. The complete list of predictors and 
the estimated results of equation (1) for all 3 models are reported in table 6. 
Estimates of model 1 corroborate expectations. The variables enterprise_age and 
manager_experience, used as proxies for human capital and entrepreneurial ability 
respectively, have positive associations with the probability of obtaining formal credit. This 
diminishes as the values of enterprise_age and manager_experience increase, as illustrated 
through the estimates of their respective squared terms. The underlying logic is that the 
length of business experience will make entrepreneurs appreciate the importance of using 
their input resources, including external finance, more efficiently. Moreover, from the 
lenders’ perspective, enterprises that have been established for a longer time may have better 
reputations, credit histories and longer-term relationships with formal credit institutions 
(Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998).  
 Because SMEs are informationally more opaque than larger enterprises and as the 
financial systems in emerging economies are still evolving considerably, banks in PCEs tend 
to use SMEs’ formal credit arrangements with their suppliers and other credit institutions as 
screening devices when considering loan applications (Cook, 1999; Agostina and Trivieri, 
2014; Beck, 2013). Our results corroborate this perspective: the difference in the estimated 
coefficient magnitudes between trade_credit and leasing_fxassets (0.1% vs. 7.0% 
respectively) underscores that banks see SMEs’ prior formal credit arrangements with other 
credit institutions as a stronger screening device when considering loan applications.  
Estimates of the effects of enterprise size, lnsales and lnlabour (see Cavaluzzo and 
Cavaluzzo, 1998), are positive and reflect that formal credit organisations prefer lending to 
larger SMEs due to the higher transaction costs associated with monitoring a large number of 
small loans. 
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Table 6: Bank loan use estimations  
 
 
Predictors 
Model 1:  
Bank Loans 
Model 2:  
Loan Collateral  
Model 3:  
Loan Interest 
Exp. Sign 
(+/-) 
Probit Marginal 
Effects (M.E.) 
Probit Marginal Effects 
(M.E.) 
 
OLS  Estimates 
enterprise_age 
 
enterprise_age2 
+ 
 
- 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 0.004** 
(0.002) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
- 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.050 
(0.045) 
- 0.047 
(0.041) 
manager_experience  
 
manager_experience2 
 
+ 
 
- 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
- 0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
- 0.003 
(0.007) 
- 0.001 
(0.035) 
- 0.006 
(0.074) 
trade_credit  
 
leasing_fxassets  
 
lnlabour 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.018) 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.023 
(0.018) 
0.043*** 
(0.014) 
- 0.004 
(0.007) 
- 0.103 
(0.290) 
- 0.680* 
(0.372) 
lnsales  
 
exp_sales 
 
services 
 
exporter 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
- 0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
 - 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
- 0.010 
(0.019) 
- 0.010 
(0.017) 
0.058 
(0.340) 
- 0.071 
(0.461) 
- 0.136 
(0.282) 
0.300 
(0.434) 
quality_cert  
 
accnts_audited  
 
product_concentr  
 
own_website  
 
city 
 
Non_EU_EE 
 
caucasus  
 
BRUM 
 
central_asia  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
0.028 
(0.021) 
0.031** 
(0.016) 
- 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
- 0.046*** 
(0.018) 
0.089** 
(0.039) 
0.089*** 
(0.028) 
- 0.120*** 
(0.028) 
- 0.175*** 
(0.034) 
 0.017 
(0.019) 
 0.025 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.042** 
(0.019) 
- 0.013 
(0.018) 
- 0.001 
(0.055) 
0.111** 
(0.051) 
0.055* 
(0.033) 
0.167*** 
(0.048) 
- 0.018 
(0.406) 
- 0.216 
(0.392) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
- 0.942*** 
(0.359) 
0.060 
(0.319) 
1.654 
(1.223) 
6.284*** 
(1.017) 
8.295*** 
(1.539) 
7.417*** 
(1.820) 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
subsidies 
 
loan_term 
 
loan_fx 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.037** 
(0.018) 
0.090*** 
(0.020) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
 - 0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
0.041 
(0.029) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
- 0.362 
(0.426) 
- 0.080 
(0.326) 
- 1.278** 
(0.493) 
- 0.007 
(0.005) 
- 0.941 
(0.774) 
Number of observations 
Goodness of fit (R
2
) 
 6813 
0.11 
 2223 
0.05 
 1965 
0.34 
 
Notes: *** refers to 1%, ** to 5%, and * to 10% levels of significance respectively. Constant terms not reported 
for brevity. Asymptotic standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Coefficients of 
Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects at the mean after probit estimation.  
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 Signs of coefficients associated with enterprise competitiveness and quality of financial 
information (exporter, quality_cert, accnts_audited, own-website, product_concentr and 
quality_cert) meet expectations. Coefficients for the BRUM and Central Asian regions have 
expected signs but the ones for the Non-EU-EE and the Caucasus regions are positive, which 
initially looks counter-intuitive. However, a closer look at the raw data shows that the Non-
EU-EE region reports the highest proportion of SMEs with bank loans and the proportion of 
SMEs with bank loans in the Caucasus region was comparable to that in the EU-EE region; 
similar observations apply to the share of foreign-exchange denominated loans. 
 The estimated coefficients of our key variables (bribes_n_gifts, gov_contract and 
subsidies) are all positive and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The 
impact of interpersonal connectedness identified in table 5 persists after controlling for 
enterprise characteristics. Although the marginal effects of the estimated coefficients should 
be interpreted with caution, results indicate that offering bribes and gifts increases the chance 
of gaining access to formal credit by 3 percent, having a government contract improves the 
chance of obtaining a bank loan by 4 percent and being in receipt of subsidies increases it by 
9 percent. 
Coefficients of our target variables bribes_n_gifts, gov_contract and subsidies are 
expected to be negative in models 2 (stringency of collateral requirements) and 3 (interest 
rate charges), as enterprises are likely to use interpersonal links to reduce collateral 
requirements and loan interest rates when obtaining bank loans; however, inspection of the 
coefficients in models 2 and 3 reveal mixed results. The coefficient of bribes_n_gifts has the 
expected sign but is only statistically significant in model 2, gov_contract is statistically 
insignificant in both models and subsidies is statistically significant only in model 3. These 
results imply that offering bribes and gifts, having a government contract and being in receipt 
of subsidies are particularly important for obtaining a bank loan while paying bribes or gifts 
soften collateral requirements and receiving subsidies lowers the cost of borrowing. 
The expected signs of lnlabour and lnsales in model 2 are uncertain due to the net 
effect of two considerations. On the one hand, larger enterprises are likely to provide banks 
with better quality information about their creditworthiness, which should lower banks’ 
collateral requirements. On the other hand, smaller enterprises are less likely to possess 
tangible collateral that is acceptable to banks, which means larger enterprises are likely to 
report more collateral. lnlabour is found to be significant in models 2 and 3: although larger 
enterprises face more stringent collateral rules, banks seem to compensate them by charging 
lower interest rates.  Of the variables contributing to enterprise creditworthiness, only 
own_website is significant in both models: these enterprises face less stringent collateral 
requirements (4%) and pay lower interest rates (almost 1% lower). 
Models 2 and 3 shed light on the quality of access to credit across regions. Financial 
systems are less developed in the BRUM, Caucasus and Central Asian regions compared with 
the EU-EE, implying enterprises are more likely to face more stringent collateral 
requirements and pay higher interest costs in these regions. Moreover, the raw data indicate 
that we should not observe a significant difference between the EU-EE and non-EU-EE 
regions.  As expected, the regression results highlight that enterprises in the BRUM, 
Caucasus and Central Asian regions face stiffer collateral requirements and pay higher loan 
rates compared to their counterparts in the EU-EE. Although SMEs in the Caucasus region 
have relatively better access to credit (model 1), they seem to be subjected to more stringent 
collateral requirements (11% more than in the EU-EE) and face higher loan interest costs 
(6.3% higher than in the EU-EE). Similarly, SMEs in the BRUM are 6 percent more likely, 
and those in Central Asia are 17% more likely, to be asked for collateral when obtaining a 
bank loan; they also pay around 7-8% more on their bank loans compared to their EU-EE 
counterparts.  
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 Since loan term and loan currency may also influence banks’ collateral requirements 
and interest rate charges, we augmented the models 2 and 3 to include loan_term and loan_fx. 
The intuition here is that collateral requirements and interest charges may vary depending on 
the duration and currency of bank loans. Hence, loan_term is expected to have a positive sign 
in both models, whereas loans_fx is expected to have a positive sign in model 2 and a 
negative sign in model 3. We reveal corroborating evidence only for a positive effect of 
loan_term in model 2. To summarise, our results reveal the following: 
 
 offering bribes or gifts, receiving subsidies and possessing a government contract all 
enhance the likelihood of an SME acquiring a bank loan, 
 paying bribes or gifts soften SME collateral requirements,  
 receiving subsidies lowers the cost of borrowing for SMEs, and 
 possessing a government contract does not reduce loan collateral requirements or 
interest repayments for SMEs. 
 
The ramifications of these results could be far-reaching with important and timely policy 
implications that have wide-spread significance for growth and development across the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such findings deserve and require sensitivity 
testing to identify the stability of the results. Below we conduct five sensitivity analyses to 
examine different aspects of stability. 
 
Sensitivity test #1: macroeconomic factors 
 
The results may be sensitive to macroeconomic factors. We re-estimate models 1-3 with three 
additional variables: the share of the private sector credit to GDP (as a proxy for financial 
depth), the inflation rate (a proxy for macroeconomic stability) and the tax rate (which was 
ranked as the number one obstacle for SMEs in our survey and hence is a proxy for the 
general business environment). Results of these estimates are presented in table 7. The results 
of model 1 reveal that only the tax rate is statistically significant in acquiring a bank loan. 
Relative to the results reported in table 6, the inclusion of these macroeconomic indicators 
marginally enhance the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients of our three 
target variables. The coefficient of the non-EU-EE region is no longer statistically significant 
now, which is broadly in line with our expectations. Re-estimations of models 2 and 3 
indicate that SMEs in the Caucasus and BRUM regions pay up to 6 percent higher inflation-
adjusted loan rates compared with their EE-EU counterparts. These estimates corroborate 
earlier results: paying bribes and gifts remain important in softening collateral requirements, 
subsidies are important in lowering the cost of borrowing and possessing a government 
contract appears to hold no statistical importance in either model.  
 
Sensitivity test #2: self-selecting borrower behaviour 
 
It is possible that the higher success rates for SMEs with interpersonal connections could be 
due to self-selecting borrower behaviour. For example, SMEs without strong interpersonal 
connections with government officials may be less optimistic about their chances of obtaining 
formal credit and hence be less likely to apply for a bank loan. The omitted variable problem 
could also affect the results. For instance, banks typically require carefully drafted business 
plans and feasibility studies when considering loan applications. The variables included in 
our models will capture many features of creditworthiness, personal wealth and 
entrepreneurial drive and skills, but an incomplete characterisation of these issues may 
impact on our results. 
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Table 7: Bank loan use estimations with selected macroeconomics covariates. 
Predictors Model 1: 
Bank Loan - Probit M.E. 
Model 2:  
Collateral - Probit M.E. 
Loan Interest - OLS 
enterprise_age 
 
enterprise_age2 
+ 
 
- 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 0.004** 
(0.002) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
- 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.040 
(0.030) 
- 0.032 
(0.028) 
manager_experience  
 
manager_experience2 
 
+ 
 
- 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
- 0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
- 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
- 0.020 
(0.070) 
trade_credit  
 
leasing_fxassets  
 
lnlabour 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.018) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 0.0004 
(0.0003) 
- 0.027 
(0.018) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
- 0.001 
(0.006) 
- 0.155 
(0.277) 
- 0.199 
(0.192) 
lnsales  
 
exp_sales 
 
services 
 
exporter 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
- 0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.052*** 
 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
- 0.009 
(0.019) 
- 0.008 
- 0.518*** 
(0.167) 
- 0.322 
(0.344) 
- 0.324 
(0.265) 
0.357 
 
quality_cert  
 
accnts_audited  
 
product_concentr  
 
own_website  
 
city 
 
e_europe_2 
 
caucasus  
 
BRUM 
 
central_asia  
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
(0.012) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
- 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
- 0.051*** 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.051) 
0.105*** 
(0.041) 
- 0.088*** 
(0.028) 
- 0.202*** 
(0.051) 
 (0.019) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.038* 
(0.021) 
- 0.018 
(0.018) 
- 0.082 
(0.052) 
0.097** 
(0.041) 
0.107** 
(0.048) 
0.109*** 
(0.048) 
(0.311) 
0.257 
(0.404) 
- 0.291 
(0.285) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
- 0.557* 
(0.330) 
0.206 
(0.246) 
0.347 
(1.084) 
5.122*** 
(1.110) 
6.032*** 
(1.733) 
2.813 
(1.940) 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
subsidies 
 
dc 
 
inflation 
 
tax_rate 
 
loan_term 
 
loan_fx 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
0.094*** 
(0.021) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
- 0.002 
(0.004) 
- 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
 - 0.039*** 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
- 0.002 
(0.002) 
- 0.013* 
(0.007) 
- 0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.025 
(0.023) 
- 0.377 
(0.373) 
- 0.068 
(0.326) 
- 0.966*** 
(0.368) 
 - 0.083** 
(0.033) 
0.573* 
(0.308) 
- 0.066 
(0.109) 
- 0.001 
(0.006) 
- 1.467* 
(0.753) 
Number of observations 
Goodness of fit (R2) 
 6813 
0.11 
 2223 
0.06 
 1965 
0.42 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * refers to statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Asymptotic standard 
errors from Probit estimations, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. The constant terms not 
reported for brevity. 
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 In order to investigate these concerns, we apply Heckman-type probit selection 
models that estimate credit use and selection equations jointly while assuming non-zero 
correlation (ρ) and joint normality of error terms (Cavaluzzo et al. 2002; Cavaluzzo and 
Cavaluzzo, 1998). If the former condition is not satisfied, i.e. ρ=0, then the results from 
general models are considered unbiased and consistent (Wooldridge, 2002; Kennedy, 2003). 
Estimation of these types of models requires an instrument that affects the probability of 
submitting a credit application in the selection model but does not belong to the main model 
in its own right. Unfortunately the dataset provides a limited set of potentially suitable 
candidates for these instruments, and we select and use three. The most promising one is the 
proportion of the senior manager’s time spent in dealing with regulatory compliance 
(time_4_reg_compliance). We conjecture that the more time managers spend in dealing with 
rules and regulations, the more likely that this could lead to forming interpersonal links with 
government officials, thereby increasing the chance of applying for a bank loan. A second 
instrument is a variable indicating whether the SMEs has a single owner (entrepreneur), and 
the argument here is that SMEs with a single owner are likely to be smaller in size compared 
to those with multiple owners who subsequently will have a higher chance of forming 
interpersonal links. We expect the sign of the entrepreneur coefficient to be negative in the 
selection model. We create a third instrument, top_obstacle_fin, which takes a value of 1 if 
SMEs cite external finance to be the most important obstacle for their operation and 0 
otherwise. Ranking external finance as a number one obstacle, from the list of 15 potential 
obstacles, is likely to be the result of detailed knowledge about and actual experience of 
applying for external finance, so we expect a positive sign for its coefficient. 
The results of these Heckman maximum likelihood probit models are reported in table 
8. Only the coefficient estimates of the target variables and those of the identifying 
instruments are reported for brevity. The results indicate that all three selection instruments 
have expected signs although entrepreneur is not statistically significant. The correlation 
coefficients between the error terms of the main and selection equations are statistically 
significant. Crucially, these results are not qualitatively different from those in table 6.
6
 
 
Sensitivity test #3: subsamples 
 
Blanchflower et al. (2003) and Muravyev et al. (2009) suggest estimating further regressions 
on sub-samples to ensure coefficient stability and we adopt the following approaches. First, 
as larger enterprises are more likely to obtain bank loans and rely on businesses’ rather than 
owners’ resources to repay obligations, we create two sub-samples involving SMEs with less 
than 10 employees versus SMEs with 10 or more employees. Second, the dataset contains a 
variable which measures respondents’ subjective evaluation of their access to bank credit 
from 0 to 4, with 0 representing ‘no obstacle’ to access to finance and 4 representing a ‘very 
severe obstacle.’ Since wealthier business owners are less likely to be constrained by a lack 
of external finance, they are also less likely to complain about access to bank credit. Hence, 
we split the sample into two with the first subsample containing SMEs with ‘no obstacle’ and 
‘minor obstacle’ responses, which we term ‘access easy,’ and the remaining responses belong 
to the second sub-sample which we term ‘access difficult.’ 
                                                          
6
  The caveat, however, is that these findings may not be suggestive of the presence or absence of selection 
problems as the similarity of the estimates with and without selection correction may also be the result of 
statistical problems (Kennedy, 2003, p.291; Wooldridge, 2006, pp.609-11) and/or because the instrument of 
our choice is not strong enough. Heckman-type models were estimated for the loan collateral (model 2) and 
loan interest (model 3) models but the null hypothesis of ρ=0 could not be rejected for the collateral model 
and none of the selected instruments were statistically significant. These results are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 8: Model 1 with Heckman maximum likelihood estimators 
Predictors Bank Loan -  
Heckprob M.E. 
Bank Loan -  
Heckprob M.E. 
Bank Loan - 
Heckprob M.E. 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
subsidies 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0.039***    
(0.012) 
0.035***    
(0.014) 
0.088***    
(0.020) 
0.033*** 
(0.012) 
0.033**   
(0.013) 
0.093***  
(0.019) 
0.035***   
(0.012) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.093***      
(0.019) 
Selection equation instruments 
time_4_reg_compliance 
 
entrepreneur 
 
top_obstacle_fin 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0.005**    
(0.002) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.112 
(0.085) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.328*** 
(0.128) 
Likelihood ratio test of the 
independence of equations (ρ=0) 
χ²(d.f.) 
9.33(1)*** 
χ²(d.f.) 
10.45(1)*** 
χ²(d.f.) 
13.90(1)*** 
Log-likelihood value 
Likelihood ratio test 
Observations 
-3989 
811.6 (26)*** 
6514 
-4160 
779.5 (26)*** 
6727 
-4317 
811.6 (26)*** 
6961 
Notes: Model 1 is identical to the one reported in Table 7; for brevity, only the results of the target 
variables and those of the selection equation instruments are reported. ***, ** and * refers to statistical 
significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. 
 
The results of these sensitivity tests are presented in table 9, and only the estimates of 
the main target variables (bribes_n_gifts, gov_contract and subsidies) are reported for 
brevity. The results for model 1 are qualitatively similar to those reported in tables 6 and 7. 
The estimated coefficients of subsidies are statistically significant in all sub-samples under 
panels A and B, and the magnitudes of the coefficients are not radically different from our 
earlier estimations. The results for bribes_n_gifts are mixed: in panel A it is statistically 
significant in the small-size enterprise sub-sample, but in panel B it is significant only at the 
10 percent level in the wealthier enterprise sub-sample. The gov_contract coefficients are 
statistically significant in the larger and wealthier enterprise sub-samples. In general, these 
sensitivity tests suggest that the effect of bribes and gifts is likely to be stronger for smaller 
enterprises and those with easy access to bank credit. Having a government contract is likely 
to have a greater effect on the ability to acquire a bank loan for larger and wealthier 
enterprises. Receiving a subsidy beneficially affects enterprises irrespective of their size or 
ability to access bank credit. 
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Table 9: Model 1 estimation results from sub-samples 
  
Model 1 - Bank loans 
 
Model 1 with 
macroeconomic variables 
 
Panel A. Enterprise size sub-samples 
 Predictors 
Less than 10 
employees 
10 or more 
employees 
Less than 10 
employees 
10 or more 
employees 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
0.078*** 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.200) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.080*** 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.19) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
subsidies 
 
0.089*** 
(0.036) 
0.096*** 
(0.021) 
0.096*** 
(0.031) 
0.094*** 
(0.023) 
N. Obs. 2357 4456 2357 4456 
 
Panel B. Access to finance sub-samples 
  Predictors 
Access  
difficult 
Access  
easy 
Access  
difficult 
Access  
easy 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
subsidies 
 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.030) 
0.104*** 
(0.029) 
0.027* 
(0.017) 
0.027** 
(0.014) 
0.080*** 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
0.113*** 
(0.030) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
0.083*** 
(0.025) 
Obs. 2669 4093 2669 4092 
Notes: Model 1 is identical to those reported in Tables 6 and 7; for brevity, only the 
results of the target variables are reported. Panel A reports the estimates from sub-samples 
split on the basis of enterprise size. For Panel B, the sample is split on the basis of 
enterprises’ subjective evaluation of their access to formal finance. ***, ** and * refers to 
statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Asymptotic standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. 
 
Sensitivity test #4: scale effects 
The estimated effects of our proxy variables for enterprise connectedness (bribes_n_gifts and 
gov_contract) on the ability to obtain a bank loan may vary with the scale of the SME. Table 
10 reports the marginal effects of bribes_n_gifts and gov_contract on holding a bank loan if 
the representative values of lnsales (panel A) and lnlabour (panel B) move two standard 
deviations from their mean values. The results show that the magnitudes of marginal effects 
of both variables increase, albeit marginally when the values of lnsales and lnlabour increase, 
confirming our earlier observation that the importance of interpersonal connections 
strengthens when the size of SMEs increases. In other words, interpersonal connections 
become increasingly important as the enterprise gets bigger. 
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Table 10: Impact of SME size on the marginal effects of target variables in Model 1 
 
 
bribes_n_gifts gov_contracts 
Marginal 
Effects 
p-value 
Marginal 
Effects 
p-value 
 
Panel A. Representative Values of Lnsales 
2 s.d. below the mean 
1 s.d. below the mean 
0.028 
0.031 
0.034 
0.028 
0.033 
0.036 
0.041 
0.031 
Mean  0.033 0.025 0.039 0.026 
1 s.d. above the mean 
2 s.d. above the mean 
0.035 
0.036 
0.023 
0.023 
0.041 
0.043 
0.023 
0.022 
 
Panel B. Representative Values of Lnlabour 
2 s.d. below the mean 
1 s.d. below the mean 
0.029 
0.031 
0.027 
0.026 
0.035 
0.037 
0.026 
0.026 
Mean  0.033 0.025 0.039 0.026 
1 s.d. above the mean 
2 s.d. above the mean 
0.035 
0.036 
0.024 
0.024 
0.041 
0.043 
0.026 
0.026 
Notes: Model 1 is identical to the one reported in Table 7; for brevity, only the results 
of the target variables are reported. ***, ** and * refers to statistical significant at the 
1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Obs: 6813. 
 
 
Sensitivity test #5: previously successful enterprises 
 
A further concern is that well-connected SMEs may have been more successful enterprises in 
the recent past and so may subsequently receive preferential treatment by banks. We estimate 
additional regressions to test the potential relationship between SME growth and our 
variables representing enterprise connectedness: bribes_n_gifts and gov_contract. We use 
two popular measures of SME growth as our dependent variables: employment growth, 
which according to Xheneti and Bartlett (2012) is one of the most reliable measures 
especially for PCEs, and sales growth. The results of these regressions are reported in table 
11. In model 4, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the SME reported employment 
growth and 0 otherwise while in model 5 the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the 
enterprise reports sales growth compared to the previous period and 0 otherwise. The results 
indicate that bribes_n_gifts are not statistically associated with either employment or sale 
growth. However, possessing a government contract is strongly and negatively associated 
with sales growth. All in all, our results indicate that enterprises with interpersonal 
connectedness to bureaucrats have better access to formal finance despite having lower 
growth potential. 
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Table 11: Impact of the target variables on SME growth 
 
Model 4: employment growth Model 5: sales growth 
Predictors 
Probit M.E. 
(Standard errors) 
Probit M.E. 
(Standard errors) 
 
Panel A: Estimations without macroeconomic variables 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
0.011 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.0144) 
-0.051*** 
(0.015) 
Obs. 6961 5628 
 
Panel B: Estimations with macroeconomic variables 
bribes_n_gifts 
 
gov_contract 
 
0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.06*** 
(0.014) 
Obs. 6961 5628 
Notes: The right hand side variables in Panels A and B are the same as those used Model 1 
reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively; for brevity, only the results of the target variables 
are reported. ***, ** and * refers to statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are 
marginal effects at the mean. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
SMEs play in important role in market-based economies in terms of employment generation, 
poverty reduction and contribution to economic growth. However, SMEs in PCEs often lack 
adequate access to appropriately-priced formal finance and a disproportionately higher 
portion of formal finance is channelled to larger enterprises. Evidence suggests that financing 
from formal, rather than informal, financial institutions is associated with faster firm growth 
(Ayyagari et al., 2008) and smaller enterprises benefit more from the improved availability of 
formal finance (Beck et al., 2008). 
 Traditional explanations to the unequal distribution of finance focus on market and 
information imperfections. A more recent approach adds an additional dimension to this 
phenomenon by highlighting the role of institutional and political factors in the economic 
process. Market-based systems can be characterised by anonymous markets and impersonal 
public and private bureaucratic organisations which, by enforcing contracts, rules and 
regulations, facilitate entrepreneurial decisions concerning exchange, production and 
investment (Weber, 1968). When markets are thin or suppressed, bureaucratic state 
institutions lack credibility and rules and laws are dysfunctional, so rent-seeking behaviour 
may became prevalent as agents try to profit from the web of interpersonal relations.  
 Growing evidence suggests that political connections play an important role in 
gaining access to formal finance for larger enterprises (Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; 
Boubakri et al., 2012, 2013). This is the first study to assess whether interpersonal 
connections with government officials (among other potential factors) improve SMEs’ access 
to formal finance across post-communist countries. Using the most recent BEEPS dataset that 
covers more than 14,000 SMEs in 28 post-communist economies, this study shows that 
access to and the use of interpersonal bureaucratic networks improve the chances of receiving 
 22 
 
bank credit by between 4 and 10 percent. The benefits of interpersonal links are also found to 
be stronger for larger SMEs. Being connected to strategic networks, however, does not seem 
to be associated with enterprise growth. 
 Our findings have important policy implications. The traditional policy response to an 
unequal distribution of finance has been to increase the supply of funds to SMEs by offering 
tax incentives to commercial banks and/or by setting up specialised institutions to cater for 
the needs of SMEs. Our results show that, in less mature market-based systems where 
political connectedness and interpersonal networks matter in issues concerning resource 
allocation, even the smaller portion of formal finance left for SMEs can be distributed 
unequally with a disproportionately higher portion being allocated to SMEs with 
interpersonal links to government officials, which consequently crowds out other SMEs from 
the credit market despite having higher investment productivity. Traditional policy measures 
designed to increase the supply of formal finance to SMEs should be complemented with 
decisive and credible reforms to improve enforceability of private contracts and the 
transparency and impartiality of bureaucratic institutions whose ultimate goals is to facilitate, 
not to hinder, market-based exchanges. Without these reforms, entrepreneurs will not be 
incentivised to use prices, rules and regulations as signals and instead will rely on 
interpersonal connections with bureaucrats, which will continue to result in a misallocation of 
scarce credit resources. 
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